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avid Hume, who attracted more than enough negative 
attention for his religious skepticism in 18th-century 
Scotland, no doubt dressed some of his writings on re-
ligion in terms that catered to popular taste and pre-
served his reputation. It is therefore difficult to know exactly what his 
personal views on religion were, for his discussions of such topics are 
often left open-ended. But even if we cannot label Hume an “atheist” or 
“agnostic” with certainty, he puts forth a number of arguments against 
basing religious faith on reason, resulting in a fideist1 perspective. To-
ward the end of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,2 he ex-
plicitly writes, “Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on rea-
son; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, 
by no means, fitted to endure” (Enquiry 89).  
But this leaves us without a normative claim. If our beliefs in God 
cannot be rational in nature, is there reason to think that we are justi-
fied in maintaining those beliefs? In this essay, I consider religious 
pragmatism as a response to Hume because it offers the religiously-
leaning individual some counsel in this area. I begin by offering a de-
scription of James’s pragmatism as it relates to religious belief. I will 
then briefly highlight some reasons for thinking that Hume, given his 
thoughts on natural beliefs and mitigated skepticism, should be sympa-
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thetic to this view. In Section III, I consider Hume’s discussions of three 
distinct versions of religious belief and show that he is, in effect, argu-
ing that none of these beliefs can be pragmatically justified. Following 
these considerations, I identify the central point of contention between 
Hume and James, as well as the motivations behind this divergence in 
thought. I ultimately argue that while there are problems with Hume’s 
views about religious belief, his overall point raises serious concerns 
about whether such belief can be pragmatically justified along Jame-
sian lines. 
 
Section I. James’s Brand of Religious Pragmatism 
 
It is important to first provide a brief discussion of what, exactly, 
James’s pragmatic picture looks like with regard to religion. In his lec-
ture “What Pragmatism Means,”3 James writes: 
 
The pragmatic method…is to try to interpret each notion by 
tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than 
that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can 
be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same 
thing, and all dispute is idle. (Pragmatism 28) 
 
The thought here is that lofty metaphysical concepts and disputes 
are only significant and/or intelligible insofar as they bring about some 
actual consequences in our lives.4  According to James, a thing’s mean-
ing and its practicality are ultimately synonymous. 
An important facet of James’s pragmatism is the conception of 
truth it entails. Truth, on this account, is not an objective principle that 
we make attempts at grasping, but a subjective method of aligning, and 
realigning, our beliefs with incoming evidence. James maintains that “a 
new opinion counts as ‘true’ just in proportion as it gratifies the indi-
vidual’s desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in 
stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its suc-
cess…in doing this, is a matter for the individual’s apprecia-
tion” (Pragmatism 36). A common objection brought against James re-
gards his supposed advocacy of “wishful thinking;” however, it is im-
portant to recognize that to merely conflate truth with whatever offers 
one the most practical benefit is to misread James. Truth, on James’s 
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account, is a subjective process, rather than an objective concept; how-
ever in order to verify x as ‘being true,’ x must align with one’s experi-
ence, it must be verified by evidence.5 The individual’s role in making x 
true lies in his acting upon x, and choosing to verify x by experience. To 
put it another way, it is the individual who chooses which beliefs to 
question, and then align with his experience, but the character of that 
alignment is ultimately dictated by facts about the external world. 
James is adamant that this process entails that “the true is the name of 
whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, 
for definite, assignable reasons” (Pragmatism 42). Toward the end of 
“What Pragmatism Means,” James writes: 
 
Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has…no objec-
tion whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you 
get about among particulars with their aid and they actually 
carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but those 
which our minds and our experiences work out together, she 
has no a priori prejudices against theology. If theological ideas 
prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragma-
tism, in the sense of being good for so much. (Pragmatism 41) 
 
Theology, as a metaphysical concept, must accord with facts that 
one verifies through experience. But the content of one’s religious be-
liefs—that is, the details of those convictions—is left open to interpreta-
tion, and should ultimately offer the believer practical benefits. Now 
whether, and which, theological ideas offer the believer practical bene-
fits seems to be something that is determined on an individual basis. 
However, it is safe to say that James is extremely open-minded when it 
comes to accruing theological evidence.6 
James published “The Will to Believe”7 some 10 years before he 
delivered his lectures on pragmatism, however a broader understand-
ing of the pragmatic approach helps to digest what James argues in the 
earlier work. In this seminal essay, he suggests that under specific cir-
cumstances, one has the right to believe certain things which may not 
be verifiable by evidence. We might point to two main points as moti-
vating this claim.  
Firstly, James stresses that although we may not acknowledge it to 
ourselves, our passions (and in fact a number of non-rational factors) 
always play a large role in our decision-making process. We like to 




that our belief sets are heavily influenced by our communities, friends 
and families, desires and fears, etc. This is specifically true in determin-
ing what hypotheses are for us “live” as opposed to “dead.” The for-
mer, according to James’s terminology, are those which we hold as po-
tentially convincing; the latter, ones which hold no plausibility for us. 
The idea here is that certain beliefs may appear to be more or less plau-
sible to different individuals; the belief set that each of us holds is ex-
tremely subjective, and is not ultimately predicated upon rational fac-
tors.  
Secondly, James argues that although many people see attaining 
truth and avoiding error as two sides of the same coin, these are in fact 
two distinct principles (WTB 18). The choices that these respective aims 
motivate may or may not intersect. James maintains that “wherever the 
option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can 
throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate save ourselves 
from…believing falsehood, by not making up our minds at all till ob-
jective evidence has come” (WTB 19-20). But in the event of a momen-
tous decision—that is, one which bears some significance on a person’s 
life— James insists that it is better to believe p and risk being wrong, 
than it is to not take the risk, and lose out on the possibility of finding 
out that p is indeed true. This is directly related to James’s point that in 
certain situations, a preliminary faith in p may actually facilitate p be-
coming true (WTB 25). In the case of religion, if I prize the avoidance of 
error over the attainment of truth, I might never actualize a potential 
relationship between myself and God. However, if I remain faithful to 
my religious convictions, it is possible that my faith will indeed lead 
me to discover this personal relationship.  
Acknowledging the large role that our passions play in determin-
ing our beliefs, as well as the potential truths that certain beliefs might 
lead us to, James argues that in the event of a live, forced,8 momentous 
hypothesis—what he calls a “genuine option”—we can choose to be-
lieve something based on our sentiments and awareness of practical 
benefits. That is to say, if there is not enough rational evidence to pro-
pel us toward one decision or another, we have a right to make this 
choice for ourselves, taking things like passion into consideration. 
Therefore, one does not need hard evidence in order to be justified in 
maintaining religious conviction; if he feels compelled by passion to 
believe, and finds religion beneficial,9 that is sufficient.10  
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Section II. Hume’s Pragmatic Side 
 
Although the pragmatic philosophical tradition did not begin until 
the late nineteenth century, many of Hume’s philosophical notions are 
not far off from pragmatist ideals. In his moral philosophy, for exam-
ple, Hume devotes specific attention to the way the utility of an action 
contributes to its social approbation.11 What I would like to draw par-
ticular attention to, though, is his treatment of natural beliefs—human 
beliefs about the world which, like religious beliefs, are not rooted in 
reason.  
The most famous of these natural beliefs which Hume refers to is 
the notion of causality, which he claims is nothing more than the con-
stant conjunction of two events, matched with an inference on the part 
of an observer. For Hume, many of the beliefs that we hold about the 
world are not actually rational. But these beliefs play an important role 
in everyday life. He therefore assumes a stance of mitigated skepticism, 
a position which remains cognizant of the fact that such knowledge 
claims are liable to falsehood, but also realizes that certain beliefs must 
be held for pragmatic reasons.12 For our present purposes, one might 
liken religious beliefs to Hume’s natural beliefs. Certainly, we can char-
acterize each in a similar way. Natural beliefs, according to Hume, are 
human beliefs about the world which are not established rationally. 
Religious beliefs seem to share in this basic nature.13 
For Hume, the non-rational nature of natural beliefs is ultimately 
outweighed by their contribution to human life—they are, in a word, 
pragmatic. His position of mitigated skepticism, then, essentially ap-
pears to be the pragmatic method in practice. Now it is certainly a rea-
sonable position to hold that religious beliefs offer practical benefits as 
well. One might maintain that religion contributes to community build-
ing, offers solace from pain and suffering, acts as a source of purpose, 
etc. And if religion is taken as being beneficial—either in the private or 
public sphere—then it seems like Hume should sign off on the view 
that religious beliefs can also be justified via a pragmatic argument.  
 
Section III. Parting Ways: Hume’s and James’s Disagreement 
 
Yet, interestingly, Hume doesn’t seem to think that religious beliefs 
can be justified on pragmatic grounds. Why he doesn’t can be gleaned 
from his discussions of three types of religious beliefs in his writings: 




in the Dialogues, “rationalistic theism.” 
Hume’s discussion of religious belief rooted in enthusiasm is 
mainly contained in his essay “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,”14 in 
which he details some of the societal effects that both superstition and 
enthusiasm—the “corruptions of true religion”—bring about. Enthusi-
astic religious belief, according to Hume, is that which results from 
sentiments of hope, pride, happiness, and the ensuing presumption 
that one is loved by a God. Although it may seem as though this points 
to a situation in which religious belief does in fact yield benefits, it is 
important to keep in mind that the positive cognitions that give rise to 
this religious conviction are not, in fact, effects of such belief, but rather 
motivators of such belief. Furthermore, Hume comments later in the 
essay: “Enthusiasm being founded on strong spirits, and a presumptu-
ous boldness of character, it naturally begets the most extreme resolu-
tions; especially after it rises to that height as to inspire the deluded 
fanatic with the opinion of Divine illuminations, and with a contempt 
for the common rules of reason, morality, and prudence” (S&E 87). He 
goes on to argue that religions stemming from enthusiasm are “furious 
and violent” and produce the “most cruel disorders in human society,” 
though they generally fade away rather quickly (S&E 87). It seems safe 
to say that Hume does not see religious enthusiasm as being particu-
larly beneficial to society.  
Hume’s treatment of superstitious religion spans a much wider 
breadth; while he discusses some of its societal effects in “Of Supersti-
tion and Enthusiasm,” he also discusses it in the Dialogues, and the 
Natural History of Religion, in which he often conflates it with 
“primitive, vulgar” faith. Superstitious religion, as opposed to enthusi-
astic religion, arises in situations where people are weak, fearful, or 
suffering, and therefore posit the existence of an ‘object of terror.’ What 
is interesting about Hume’s account of superstitious religion is that he 
never suggests that this positing of a Godhead offers those who are 
suffering a sense of solace and comfort; rather, they actively fear this 
God, and act in ways that might bring about an end to the punishment 
that He is supposedly inflicting upon them. Hume argues that religious 
superstition is bad for civil liberty, but that it is good for “priestly 
power” and thus oppression of the general public. Superstitious relig-
ion, he writes, “steals in gradually and insensibly; renders men tame 
and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, and seems inoffensive 
to the people: till at last the priest, having firmly established his author-
ity, becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society, by his endless 
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contentions, persecutions, and religious wars” (S&E 87).15 Superstitious 
religion, according to Hume, fosters feelings of inadequacy and humil-
ity, which makes man especially susceptible to subjugation.16 
In considering his writings, it seems that Hume does not think that 
religious belief stemming from superstition offers any worthwhile prac-
tical benefits. Even if it does for a handful of individuals, the over-
whelming negative consequences that generally result from this sort of 
religious belief completely overshadow any such prospects.  
It should be noted, at this interval, that James is as opposed to dog-
matic religion as Hume is. He offers: “the general triumph of 
[pragmatism] would mean an enormous change in… the 
‘temperament’ of philosophy. Teachers of the ultra-rationalistic type 
would be frozen out… Science and metaphysics would come much 
nearer together, would in fact work absolutely hand in 
hand” (Pragmatism 31). Indeed, James would likely agree with Hume in 
that the sorts of religious beliefs which may be characterized as 
“enthusiastic” and “superstitious”—both dogmatic religious tradi-
tions17—are more harmful than they are helpful. This is not a point of 
contention between the two philosophers, but a point of consensus: 
neither philosopher argues in favor of religious dogmatism. 
Let us turn, now, to that “rational theism” that Hume speaks of in 
the Dialogues, which, unlike its predecessors, is non-dogmatic and em-
pirical. After leveling a number of objections against the a posteriori reli-
gious argument from design, a stripped-down, modest observation is 
made in the twelfth and final section of the book. Philo, the skeptic in 
Hume’s work, eventually concedes that “a purpose, an intention, a de-
sign strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and 
no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject 
it,” but this perception is not at all what the religious believer needs it 
to be (Dialogues 116). He offers:  
 
If the whole of natural theology…resolves itself into one sim-
ple, though somewhat ambiguous, as least undefined proposi-
tion, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably 
bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this propo-
sition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular 
explication: If it afford no inference that affects human life, or 
can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the anal-
ogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther…what can the 




than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition… 
(Dialogues 129) 
 
Hume ultimately concludes that the debate between theists and 
atheists is merely a verbal one concerning degrees of analogy: “The 
theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human 
reason: The atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears 
some remote analogy to it” (Dialogues 120). But this mutual conclusion 
is a vacuous one. In the end, all we can say is that the order in the uni-
verse bears some remote analogy to human intelligence. Any state-
ments beyond that are mere non-rational speculations.  
What is particularly interesting about this is that Hume’s com-
ments here are completely in line with James’s remarks on the prag-
matic test put forth in “What Pragmatism Means.” James writes: 
 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes col-
lapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this 
simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no 
difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference else-
where—no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express it-
self in a difference in concrete fact and in concrete consequence 
upon that fact... (Pragmatism 30) 
 
What matters for James is not the theological observation that the 
world resembles the product of a creator. Indeed, he would agree with 
Hume that this statement, on its own, is an empty one. What James 
would turn his attention to is the content of said belief. According to 
James, the practical benefits, and therefore pragmatic justification of, 
religious belief does not enter into the conversation at the theoretical 
level, but at the point at which one acts on his belief. This is the point at 
which Hume and James diverge in thinking, for Hume suggests that 
there is virtually no difference in the behavior of the rational theist and 
the atheist, and therefore, no great division between the two in terms of 
philosophical allegiance. He does not seem to acknowledge that the 
rational theist can have content-rich beliefs, and so the philosophical 
dispute that he and the atheist engage in does indeed “collapse.” As 
Charles Echelbarger writes, “the only conclusion warranted by 
[Hume’s version of] natural religion is so broad and general that it is 
actually consistent with atheism” (Echelbarger 31).   
It seems, then, that the crucial point on which Hume and James 
Moriah Ellenbogen 41 
disagree is this: that non-dogmatic religious belief can significantly im-
pact one’s life. Both Hume and James are empiricists, and, as such, offer 
versions of religious faith which are rooted in empiricism. But whereas 
James wants to say that we are justified in moving beyond a basic theo-
logical theory, and assuming content-rich beliefs that bring about prac-
tical benefits, Hume does not appear to agree. The Humean believer is 
left without counsel at this juncture, for his rational theism, void of con-
tent, does not give him any reason to accept or reject his religious be-
liefs.18 Insofar as the believer does move beyond rational theism, he 
seems to fall into dogmatism, which brings about more harm than 
not.19 We can point to two reasons for this divide in thought.  
First, a key discrepancy in the thinking of Hume and James is that 
the latter is concerned with justification as it pertains to passional belief, 
while it is unclear whether Hume recognizes this concept. James has a 
very specific audience in mind: his speech is directed toward those who 
are open to religious thinking, those for whom religion is a live hy-
pothesis.20 They are compelled to believe, and are searching not for a 
reason to believe, but for justification for their beliefs. Hume, though, 
does not seem to be one of these individuals.21 He suggests that a ra-
tional individual cannot move beyond the simple recognition that the 
world resembles a product of creation, but there is no talk of the pas-
sional religious believer. The mitigated skepticism that Hume advo-
cates in response to natural beliefs does not seem to apply to religious 
beliefs, for the former seems to be a necessary, inescapable facet of hu-
man cognition, while committing oneself to the latter resembles some-
thing of a choice. For James’s target audience, though, religious belief is 
clearly not a choice. 
Second, James and Hume seem to disagree that religious belief can 
yield practical benefits. The main reason for this division, I think, lies in 
the philosophers’ respective areas of focus. James’s discussion of reli-
gious belief is highly individualized; he is interested in the personal 
benefits that one might derive from religious belief. And the risk that is 
involved in religious belief is a personal one, as well: in choosing to 
commit oneself to his religious sentiments, one is running the risk of 
being wrong. In contrast, Hume’s consideration of the consequences of 
religious belief is carried out nearly exclusively on a societal level.22 He 
does not pay much (if any) attention to the personal benefits of reli-
gious belief. It might be said, then, that each philosopher’s perspective 
is too narrow, albeit in different ways. Hume needs to acknowledge the 




notion that religion is confined to the individual sphere is perhaps na-
ïve.  
Although there is reason to think that Hume should extend prag-
matic justification to religious belief, it is apparent from textual evi-
dence that this is not the case. We have considered the reasons for the 
two philosophers’ divergence in thought, and the remaining considera-
tion is an evaluative one: which perspective is better? James’s position 
seems to be an ideal middle-ground for the religiously-minded empiri-
cist: he can justify subscribing to his religious leanings, but also main-
tain a non-dogmatic, fallibilist attitude. Hume’s believer,23 in contrast, 
is left stranded between his religious sentiments and his allegiance to 
empiricism; there is nothing to propel him one way or the other, and 
no obvious way to reconcile the two. It seems, at first glance, as though 
James’s position is the obviously preferable one, however Hume’s re-
luctance to justify religious belief points to a deeper worry that James 
seems blind to: is it possible to reap the benefits of religion while re-
maining non-dogmatic? 
I do not doubt that there are some benefits that a non-dogmatic, 
fallibilist believer might procure from his religious belief. For example, 
one might acknowledge that his religious beliefs are subject to error, 
and yet maintain membership in a supportive, sociable religious com-
munity. However, there are a handful of benefits which stem from re-
ligion—namely a sense of comfort in times of need, a profound sense of 
purpose in life, and perhaps also moral strenuousness—which are nec-
essarily tied to a sense of certainty, and therefore at odds with a falli-
bilist religious perspective. In order to derive the sort of profound, 
deep-seated solace that religious belief can yield, one must be entirely 
committed to one’s beliefs. He must not only think that they are the best 
beliefs to hold, but that they are fundamentally correct. Maintaining a 
non-dogmatic mindset—that is, preserving an awareness that one 
might eventually accrue evidence which discredits one’s religious be-
liefs—seems to entail an underlying doubt, an ever-present worry 
(however small that worry may be) that one has adopted a falsehood as 
truth. And this concern would be the sort of thing that would prevent 
an individual from capitalizing on the reassurance and consolation that 
religion might offer. Thus, while Hume may not be entirely fair in his 
consideration of benefits one might derive from religion, he provides a 
crucial insight: non-dogmatic religious belief may be limited in the 





1. Fideism is simply the position that “faith is in some sense 
independent of, if not outright adversarial toward, rea-
son” (Amesbury, Richard. "Fideism." Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Stanford University, 26 Sept. 2012. Web.) 
2. Henceforth cited as Enquiry 
3. Henceforth cited as Pragmatism 
4. By this view, universal principles, such as “God,” and the 
“absolute” are not to be considered as ends in themselves, or, 
as James calls them, “solving principles.” Rather, “you must 
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work 
within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a so-
lution, then, than as a program for more work, and more par-
ticularly as an indication of the ways in which existing reali-
ties may be changed. Theories thus become instruments, not 
answers to enigmas, in which we can rest” (Pragmatism 31-2). 
5. No chain of experience, according to James, can lead one to a 
false truth. 
6. This is especially evident in The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence, in which James recounts a wide range of highly-
subjective religious phenomenon.   
7. Henceforth cited as WTB 
8. A forced option, according to James, is one in which the 
agent has no choice but to make a decision. For James, the 
choice to adopt religious belief is a forced one. One can 
choose to adhere to his religious beliefs, or one can reject 
them. Remaining an “agnostic” is no way out of this di-
lemma— in practice, it leads one to a state that is effectively 
no different than atheism, and as such, is ultimately the same 
as choosing to abstain from religious belief. 
9. And he has no specific evidence against religion 
10. And James is certainly of the opinion that for some individu-
als, religion brings with it a number of practical benefits. Re-
ligion offers some a feeling of pure joy and ecstasy (see The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, esp. “The Religion of Healthy
Notes 
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-Mindedness”).  It can provide an individual with peace of 
mind, solace from suffering, and a sense of purpose. As 
James writes toward the end of “The Moral Philosopher and 
the Moral Life”: “Every sort of energy and endurance, of 
courage and capacity for handling life’s evils, is set free in 
those who have religious faith” (Moral Philosopher 213). In 
this same essay, James also suggests that any notion of a sta-
ble and systematic morality (which may be idealistic for 
some), depends on the existence of a God. Relatedly, he sug-
gests that religious beliefs are necessary in bringing about the 
“strenuous mood”— a perspective which causes us to look 
beyond present ills and act in ways that bring about the best 
long-term benefits. He makes the claim that “in a merely hu-
man world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy 
falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, 
is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but it 
is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the 
infinite scale of values fails to open up” (212). James ulti-
mately sees religion as having the potential to introduce us to 
a plethora of benefits that we might not ever lay our hands 
on otherwise. 
11. See An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, esp. Section 
V. 
12. Hume writes at the end of the Enquiry Concerning Human Un-
derstanding: “The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the exces-
sive principles of skepticism, is action, and employment, and 
the occupations of common life. These principles may flour-
ish and triumph in the schools…But as soon as they leave the 
shade…they vanish like smoke, and leave the most deter-
mined sceptic in the same condition as other mor-
tals” (Enquiry 109-10). 
13. Now, while a commonality undoubtedly exists between reli-
gious beliefs and natural beliefs, there are differences as well. 
Firstly, it seems as though everyone has natural beliefs, while 
only some people have a propensity towards religious be-




able—a naturally-functioning human being cannot shake 
them off. It is not clear that the same goes for religious be-
liefs. It might be true that a man of deep religious conviction 
cannot rid himself of his religious mindset, no matter how 
hard he tries. However, in less rigid cases—perhaps in the 
case of an individual who is sympathetic to religious senti-
ments but also harbors doubts—it is indeed plausible that 
religious beliefs, or in the very least conformity to tradition-
ally religious lifestyles, are adopted by choice (this will be 
addressed further in Section III). 
14. But even with these discrepancies in mind, the basic analogy 
between natural and religious beliefs remains noteworthy. 
Just as people cannot distance themselves from their beliefs 
in causal connections, it seems safe to say that some people 
find it difficult to distance themselves from their propensities 
toward religious belief, even after acknowledging that such 
conviction is not rational. 
15. Henceforth cited as S&E 
16. Even toward the end of the Dialogues, Hume spends some 
time discussing the all-too-common insincerity expressed by 
religious figures, and the corruption and general immorality 
that can arise from superstitious religious doctrines. Philo, 
the religious skeptic, who is generally taken to be Hume’s 
own voice in the dialogues, asks: “How happens it…if vulgar 
superstition be so salutary to society, that all history abounds 
so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on 
public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions 
of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal con-
sequences which always attend its prevalency over the 
minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any 
historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a 
detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time 
can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is 
never regarded, or heard of” (Dialogues 122). 
17. This is directly tied to Hume’s notion of the “monkish vir-
tues,” another negative effect that he sees as stemming from 
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religious belief. Discussed mainly in An Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, these traits include “celibacy, fasting, 
penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, soli-
tude” (Second Enquiry 258). According to Hume, certain reli-
gious individuals hold these characteristics in high esteem; 
however, sensible men will regard them as vices, for they 
“serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s for-
tune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member 
of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of com-
pany, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment” (Second En-
quiry 258). From Hume’s point of view, if religion venerates 
qualities such as these, then it seems as though religion moti-
vates a person to seek out discomfort and suffering. Certainly 
this does not bode well for a consideration of the positive ef-
fects of religion on the human psyche. 
18. Whether enthusiastic religion may be characterized as dog-
matic is not made as clear. Hume’s discussion of the latter is 
much more extensive; however, I think that one is justified in 
attributing dogmatism to former as well. He writes: “[In en-
thusiastic religion] human reason, and even morality, are re-
jected as fallacious guides; and the fanatic madman delivers 
himself over, blindly and without reserve, to the supposed 
illapses of the Spirit” (S&E 82). 
19. His best option, it seems, is to maintain an agnostic position. 
But agnosticism, according to James (and Hume, according to 
Philo’s remarks on rational theism), is tantamount to athe-
ism. 
20. It is worth mentioning, at this point, that in the Natural His-
tory of Religion, Hume discusses what may be a superstitious, 
but non-dogmatic form of religion: polytheism. Ultimately, 
though, Hume has very little respect for such “vulgar” and 
“primitive” notions, and does not even consider them to be 
religious in the same sense as monotheistic traditions. He 
writes: “To any one, who considers justly of the matter, it 
will appear, that the gods of all polytheists are not better than 




pious worship or veneration. These pretended religionists 
are really a kind of superstitious atheists, and acknowledge 
no being, that corresponds to our idea of a deity” (Natural 
History 145). 
21. He writes in The Will to Believe: “It is evident that unless there 
be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy 
water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living 
option” (WTB 6). 
22. One might even contend that for Hume, religion was a dead 
hypothesis. 
23. Even the monkish virtues, which appear to be a highly indi-
vidualized result of religion, are discussed within a larger 
societal framework: they facilitate the spread of dominance 
and oppression—specifically “priestly power”—within cer-
tain populations. 
24. That is, a religious believer who seeks prescriptive advice 
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